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AbstrAct
In a globalized economy it is relevant to question whether the Nordic Working Environment (WE) 
model will remain as the basic and implicit framework for the governance of the WE. This paper 
explores institutional changes in the governance of the WE, and critically examines how a more 
explicit and market-oriented framework might influence the governance of the WE in the Nordic 
countries. Firstly, the paper examines the changes in the governance of the WE at the societal level 
(Denmark) for the period 1954 – 2007, and identifies institutional logics informing these changes. 
Secondly, the paper examines changes in the governance of the WE at the level of the construction 
sector, using case material from four of the largest construction projects completed in Denmark 
in recent years. The analyses reveal three discrete periods, representing distinct logics influencing 
the governance of the WE, i.e., the logic of the state, the logic of democracy and the logic of the 
market. The logic of the state and the logic of democracy represent an implicit framework, whereas 
the logic of the market entails a shift to a more explicit framework. The shift to a more explicit 
framework for the governance of the WE, is also identified at the level of the construction sector. 
This leads to a pivotal shift in the clients’ and the construction companies’ relationship with the 
institutional environment in the four large construction projects. From worker representatives being 
the primary stakeholders, to a shift where the fulcrum of the development of the WE lies between 
management, the state and stakeholders in the companies’ environment. This shift opens up a 
range of new and more market-oriented approaches to the governance of the WE that seems to 
challenge the extant Nordic WE model. 
Key worDs
Construction industry / Governance / health and safety / institutional theory / regulation / reputa-
tional risk / worker participation. 
Introduction
The Nordic Working Environment (WE) model, as a part of the Nordic Labour Mar-ket model, constitutes a long tradition of cooperation between social partners and the state, including collective agreements and participative approaches. This model 
has been taken for granted as an implicit framework with a strong impact on the gover-
nance of the WE in the Nordic Countries (Lindøe et al. 2001:22). The Nordic WE model 
has also provided an important impetus for the development of the EU Framework 
Directive for the WE (Riis & Jensen 2002). In a globalized economy with increased 
competition and flux of management concepts across borders, it is relevant to question 
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whether the Nordic WE model will remain as the basic framework for the governance 
of the WE. This article explores institutional changes in the governance of the WE and 
critically examines how these changes might influence the Nordic WE model, using the 
construction industry as the exemplar.
In a conversation I had with safety representatives involved in the building of the 
large and prestigious Multimedia house of the Danish Broadcasting Corporation, 
“Danmarks Radio” (DR), they expressed that “safety matters have become too important 
for management to leave it up to the workers”. This observation by the safety representa-
tives is symbolic of the changes in the governance of the WE that will be explored in this 
paper. The construction industry is known for being one of the most hazardous work-
places, because of the higher frequency and severity of accidents in the Nordic countries 
(Mikkelsen et al. 2004), as well as in the EU (Eurostat 2004; Lindøe et al. 2001). The client 
DR was aware that incidences of poor work safety in the construction of the Multimedia 
house could jeopardize the brand of DR. The client DR had the goal that the building site 
of the new multimedia house should be the safest in Denmark, and they put a lot of efforts 
in the management of the WE during the construction. In a ceremony in the Spanish city 
Bilbao, November 2004, the project received the ‘European Good Practise Award 2004’, 
granted by the European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (2004). Hereby the repu-
tation as a responsible client and a safe construction site were established. 
This event can be seen as an expression of a turn of events in which the WE has 
assumed greater strategic importance to companies in their endeavours to demonstrate 
social responsibility. However, seen in a historical perspective, companies’ social respon-
sibility for the WE started a long time ago. The Nordic WE model, building on a strong 
cooperation among social partners and the state, is an institution associated with certain 
structures, understandings and social practices, which for over 100 years has developed 
and institutionalized social responsibility for people at work (Andreasen et al. 1999; 
Anne Trine Larsen 2005; Lindøe et al. 2001). National and international legislation and 
agreements between social partners have increasingly meant that employees have been 
involved in decisions affecting the management of companies (Hägglund & Degerblad 
1996:143-149; Kristiansen 2005:388). Seen in this perspective, the past 10 years’ more 
intensive focus on corporate social responsibility (CSR) in management circles, by au-
thorities and various international organizations, seems to knock on open doors.
This paper argues that the social responsibility historically has been institutional-
ized in a number of societal institutions in the Nordic countries that allocates rights and 
duties, and thus limits the discretion of companies when it comes to the WE (Kristiansen 
2005; Walters & Frick 2000). However, what is accepted as a social responsible behav-
iour will be under constant change and influenced by the extant institutional framework 
and governance structures (Rocha 2010). This assumption also entails that the predomi-
nant governance principles informed by the Nordic WE model in the various historical 
periods will influence social responsibility related to the WE. But what changes has the 
Nordic WE Model undergone and what happens when a more explicit and market-
oriented framework, such as the CSR strategy, meets the implicit social responsibility in 
the Nordic WE Model? 
Two research questions will be investigated in the following: what changes have 
there been in the institutional logics informing the governance of the WE and what im-
pact do these changes have on the governance of the WE at the industry and at the com-
pany level? On the basis of these inquiries the article discusses whether a more explicit 
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and market oriented framework, is a complementary approach to the governance of the 
WE or whether it is an alternative that poses a challenge to the Nordic WE model.
This is done, partly in a historical perspective, at the societal level (Denmark), inves-
tigating the institutional changes in the governance of the WE within the Nordic Model, 
and partly, at industry and company levels, using the construction industry in Denmark 
as the exemplar. 
theoretical and methodological approach
In this paper I make use of neo-institutional theory, which is particularly well suited to 
combine a historical analysis of the evolution of governance structures related to the 
WE at the societal level (Dyreborg 2006), with an analysis of the influence on the gover-
nance of the WE at the levels of industry and companies (Campbell 2004; Thornton & 
Ocasio 2008). Friedland and Alford (1991) suggested that the core institutions of soci-
ety, market, state, families, democracy and religion each has a central logic. This insti-
tutional logic constrains the means and ends of individual behaviour and is constitutive 
of individuals, organisations and society. There will often be more conflicting logics in 
a field, e.g., market, state and professions (Scott et al. 2002). This approach rejects both 
individualistic rational choice theories and macro structural perspectives.
Thorntorn and Ocasio (1999) defined institutional logics as ‘the socially construct-
ed, historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time and 
space, and provide meaning to their social reality’. Institutional logics consist of both 
structural (regulative), normative (behavioural) and symbolic (cognitive) carriers.
Institutions are thus understood as social structures that have attained a high degree 
of resilience but are at the same time subject to change processes, both incremental and 
discontinuous (Campbell 2004; DiMaggio & Powel 1991). In this perspective the WE 
must be seen as embedded in an institutional context which provides stability and mean-
ing to social practice in the field, but is at the same time subject to change processes. 
Furthermore, this paper uses the distinction between an implicit and an explicit 
framework, as suggested by Matten and Moon (2004), as an additional approach to 
explain changes in the governance of the WE. The implicit framework consists of values, 
norms and rules which result in primarily mandatory requirements for corporations, 
e.g., requirements related to the WE. The explicit framework would normally consist of 
voluntary, self-interest driven policies, programmes and strategies by corporations (e.g., 
CSR), addressing issues (e.g., fair payment, child labour, work safety etc.), perceived as 
being part of their social responsibility by the company and/or its stakeholders (Matten 
& Moon 2008).
A multi-level approach is taken, i.e., the societal level, the level of the construction 
industry and the level of the individual company. In the first part of the paper I will trace 
significant shifts in the institutional logics at the societal level (Denmark), which has 
informed the governance of the WE in the period 1954 - 2007. This analysis is based on 
written historical sources, e.g., issues of the magazine ‘Working Environment’(Fälling & 
Lindegaard 1984) from 1954 to 2007 (in Danish; ‘Pas På!’, ‘Tidsskrift for Arbejdsmiljø’ 
and ‘Magasinet Arbejdsmiljø’), books, governmental policies and documents. On a more 
operational level means – end relationships are mapped in the data material, and means – 
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end relationships that are widely reflected in all levels in the institutional field are defined 
as institutional logics. As institutional logics are resilient structures that only change very 
slowly it can be difficult to determine the exact point in time where a new dominating 
logic begins to take over. For this reason I used significant legislative changes as indica-
tors for transitions from one period to another, knowing that these transitions can take 
several years and be preceded by significant cognitive and normative changes or events 
in the institutional field. Two important shifts, and thus three periods were identified in 
the studied period from 1954 to 2007.
To gain more insight into the importance of the institutional context for the individual 
company’s governance of safety, in the latter two periods, an analysis on the level of the 
construction sector and the individual construction company will also be carried out. Data 
from four case studies of major infrastructure projects will be analysed, i.e., the Great 
Belt tunnel and bridge Link that was built in the years 1988-1998, connecting Funen and 
Zealand; the Oresund Bridge that was built in year 1992 – 2000, a tunnel and bridge con-
necting Denmark and Sweden; the Copenhagen Metro phase 1 and 2 that was built in the 
years 1994-2002, and finally the Multimedia house of the Danish Broadcasting Corpora-
tion (DR), which was built between 1999 and 2009. These analyses are based on case ma-
terial that includes interviews, observations and written materials collected from company 
files. The data were analysed using the software program Nvivo 2 (Gibbs 2002), and the 
units of analyses are the institutional logics (means – end relationships) (Dyreborg 2006). 
responsibility for the we has a long history
It is not something new that companies should take responsibility for the safety of their 
employees as this has been stipulated by national and international labour laws and con-
ventions for more than a century (Koch & Nielsen 1998). Even in ancient time the responsi-
bility of a builder was laid down in the legal codes by King Hamurabi (Richardson 2000).
“§ 229: If a builder builds a house for someone, and does not construct it properly, and the 
house which he built falls in and kills its owner, then that builder shall be put to death”. 
(Babylon law on constructions King Hamurabi, 1728-1686 BC)
The root of this governing principle is the fear of getting equitable retribution in case of an 
incident, and the normative standard for retaliation is the principle of an eye for an eye. It 
is unmistakable that a certain pressure was put on the part of the builder to do a proper 
job. Even if the basic idea of making somebody responsible for one’s actions is not unfa-
miliar to us, it is, nevertheless, hard to believe that serious failures in construction work in 
our time, would entail the same tough consequences on the part of the builder. 
From the 1800’s onwards various laws aiming at reducing the working hours for 
children were introduced. In the United Kingdom the Factories Acts were already in-
troduced at the beginning of the 1800s. The first acts were introduced in Denmark in 
1873, and similar acts subsequently appeared in the other Nordic countries (Hägglund 
& Degerblad 1996; Koch & Nielsen 1998).
Seen from this perspective social responsibility related to the WE has for a long time 
been an issue that companies needed to take into account when doing business. This 
responsibility is driven by the normative pressure and enforcement of rules and regula-
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tions in the actual social context (Matten & Moon 2004; Preuss et al. 2006). I would 
thus propose that social responsibility for people’s WE is not a new issue as such, but the 
way in which responsibility is perceived and governed is influenced by the institutional 
context (Campbell 2006). This will also apply to companies’ responsibility for the WE. 
The Nordic WE is regulated mainly by transposition of WE Acts related to the 
European Framework Directive and the enforcement is managed by national Labour 
Inspectorates, which in Denmark falls under the Ministry of Employment. Another im-
portant part of the governance system in the Nordic Countries is the involvement of 
the social partners, which plays an important role in developing and supporting the 
labour laws. The social partners themselves can establish agreements related to the WE 
with some of them based on transposition of EU legislation. The agreements between 
the social partners govern the contractual relationship between the employee and the 
employer, whereas the legal system, i.e., the WE Act, primarily concerns the relationship 
between the employee and the WE surrounding the employee. However, these two gov-
erning systems are increasingly intertwined, in particularly when it comes to the psycho-
social WE (Kristiansen 2005:388; Lindøe et al. 2001:27). 
The empirical work related to the historical analysis includes the period from 1954 
to 2007, where two major shifts in the governance of the WE were identified. First, a 
shift from a command and control approach to a democracy and employee involvement 
approach was identified (first shift). The command and control governance approach 
draws on the logic of the state, and the democracy and employee involvement approach 
draws on the logic of democracy. Later in the period, a shift from a governance ap-
proach based on democracy and employee involvement to governance structures based 
on competition and reputational risk was identified (second shift). The competition and 
reputational risk draws on the logic of the market. These changes should not be under-
stood as a linear development with successive phases of logics, but rather that several 
(conflicting) logics might be present simultaneously with varying degree of influences. 
Two other but less dominant logics were also identified in the empirical material. In 
particular a basic logic of prevention, i.e., “it is better to prevent than to cure”. This ap-
peared as a basic and relatively tacit and taken-for-granted logic in the field, throughout 
the period. Another less dominant logic throughout the period was the logic of profes-
sions and knowledge related to the state bureaucracy, science and professional bod-
ies, e.g., the occupational health service. The logic of professions is a logic that can be 
identified in other fields as well, e.g., in the financial sector and in the health care sector 
(Lounsbury 2002; Scott et al. 2002). 
In the following, I empirically demonstrate these shifts within a Danish context and 
then include the other Nordic countries in the discussion.
First shift: From logic of the state to logic of democracy (1954-1975) 
The Command and Control Period 
In 1954 a new law on industrial safety was introduced in Denmark, where safety 
committees became mandatory in dangerous factories (Socialministeriet 1956). These 
changes were already discussed in the 1930’s but because of the Second World War the 
work on the law was deferred. Workers were also to elect a safety representative in es-
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tablishments with ten or more employees. Although the safety committees at that time 
structurally resembled today’s Joint Health and Safety Committees, it is essential for this 
article’s argument to show that the former safety committees were not based on democ-
racy and employee involvement, but that the committees and the safety representatives 
were ‘labour inspector deputies’ who controlled the employers’ WE activities (Dwyer 
2000:168). 
In this way the safety committees and safety representatives could ensure com-
pliance with the law on a daily basis, and thus serve as a supplement to the Labour 
Inspectorate, who only periodically inspected the premises (Federation of Workers’ 
Education, Denmark - Arbejdernes Oplysningsforbund i Danmark (AOF) 1960; Rieper 
1985: 86). In the Statutory Order of the Ministry of Social Affairs, from 1955, “Guid-
ance on safety representatives” (Socialministeriet 1955), the focus was mainly on the 
safety representative’s role as an inspector of work colleagues behaviour, and their duty 
to inform their employer about safety problems in relation to work and machines. 
In practice the safety representative was primarily imposed the role as the one who 
admonishingly kept a watchful eye on colleagues’ accident-prone behaviour (Rieper 
1985), in order to ensure:
“that workers strictly adhere to the rules and regulations that have been introduced in 
order to protect them from dangers and health risks, and that they respect and keep active 
the preventive measures that may be taken with this in mind, and using these measures 
according to their purposes” (Nilsson 1956).1
Members of the Safety Committees acted in this way as the Labour Inspection’s “inter-
nal watchdog” ‘in the daily safety work, and the safety representatives educated their 
work colleagues in working safely with the new dangerous industrial machinery, and in 
this way controlled that the legal provisions were complied with.
“The background for the establishment of safety committees in the industry was initially 
that is was realized, that labour inspectors only have the possibility to inspect the indi-
vidual company, with longer intervals.” (Atlung 1961).
In this period the predominant view was the worker protection perspective. Work ac-
cidents and occupational diseases were perceived as by-products of the modern devel-
opment, which could easily be eliminated through workers’ awareness, the provision of 
information about hazards and technical progress in the industry (Federation of Workers’ 
Education, Denmark - Arbejdernes Oplysningsforbund i Danmark (AOF) 1960).
“It must be considered a matter of course to ensure the removal of the hazards, which may 
appear, and when an accident happens, it will often be because you either were unaware 
of it or you have not recognized an existing danger” (Secretary, Jørgen Nicolaisen, Labour 
Inspection Authority (AOF 1960:12).
In summary, it can be concluded that the governing principle, which should ensure so-
cietal responsibility for the WE in this period, was the enforcement of the WE Act. The 
logic behind the enforcement and development of the WE was thus a command and 
control approach drawing on the logic of the state, and the normative standard was 
defined by the WE standards specified in the Act.
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Employee Involvement
In 1973, the Danish Parliament passed a law on employee representatives on corporate 
boards. Prior to this adoption, there had been a broad societal debate on the democ-
ratization of industry, preparation of reports as well as a bill on economic and indus-
trial democracy presented in the Danish parliament (Christensen & Westenholz 2001). 
At the referendum in 1972 the majority voted for Denmark’s membership in the 
European Community (EC). There had already been a discussion of industrial democ-
racy among former members of the EC, where West Germany already had introduced 
employee representatives on company boards. This resulted, according to Christensen 
and Westenholz (2001), that the right-wing parties and employers’ professional organi-
zations considered democratization as harmless, and perhaps even necessary.
The worker protection laws were reviewed in the 1970s, and employee influence 
was suggested as a new instrument to improve the WE, not least because of pressures 
from the General Workers Union (Kolstrup 2006). In 1972 a new legislation came into 
force in the internal management of the WE (Fälling 1972b), which established that all 
companies with more than ten employees should implement a safety organization, i.e., 
a safety committee with representation of employees and management. Furthermore, 
a more comprehensive WE Act was decided on in 1973 and came into force the on 
1. July 1977. Democracy as a basic idea had its entry in terms of employee participation 
in company boards and on the internal cooperation and development of the WE, sup-
ported by the social partners. However, the employer’s managerial rights remained unaf-
fected, although the Working Environment Act could be viewed as a systematic and very 
comprehensive exemption from employer’s managerial rights (Kristiansen 2005:388). 
Similar WE Acts came into force in Norway on 1. July 1977, in Island on 1. January 
1981, and in Sweden the new law came on 1. July 1998 (Lindøe et al. 2001:25). Finland 
had experienced smaller successive changes in WE legislation during the years.
The organising principle behind the strengthening of the safety organization was 
that the working conditions in future should be improved through the democratiza-
tion of working life. The Social Democratic Minister of Work, Erling Dinesen, set up 
an independent working group that aimed to scrutinize the fundamental objective of 
the worker protection laws (‘Arbejdsmiljøgruppen af 1972’ 1973; 1974; 1975; 1976; 
Fälling 1972a). Democratization of working life was a major focal point for this work-
ing group, which featured three major reasons for democratization. Firstly, employee 
involvement was in itself a tool to create a better WE. Secondly, employee involvement 
in itself affects the WE, and the third reason was that the individual’s influence should be 
considered as a right in itself (‘Arbejdsmiljøgruppen af 1972’ 1976). Several approaches 
and degrees of influence on the working conditions were suggested, but the result of the 
later WE Act was a participation-based model, where the legal basis protected safety 
representatives against arbitrary dismissal and loss of income during their safety work 
similar to the protection of shop stewards (Kolstrup 2006:15).
The revised WE Act of 1975 (Arbejdsministeriet 1975) and the later 1978-Order 
(Arbejdsministeriet 1978), put a great deal of emphasis on the employees’ influence on 
planning and processes with a focus on minimizing harmful exposures from the WE 
(Arbejdstilsynet 1988). The basic idea of the legal framework was now clearly shifted so 
that it was the working conditions which were to be adapted to the employees, and not 
vice versa - the workplace was now considered the patient, not the employees (Sønderriis 
142 Safety matters have become too important for management Johnny Dyreborg
1989). This became a slogan for the changes in the new approaches to solving WE prob-
lems, in opposition to the system with company physicians, where the worker in practice 
was the patient. In the official discourse the admonitory attention was now, in principle, 
called to the harmful environment around the employees, and to a lesser degree the em-
ployees themselves. Another important aspect of the 1975-law was the change from the 
worker protection perspective, which acted to protect workers from some well-defined 
and isolated hazards in the production environment, to the introduction of a broader and 
more inclusive concept of ‘working environment’, where issues related to the WE could 
be raised by workers and problems could be settled locally by negotiation (Kabel et al. 
2008; Lorentzen 1988; Sørensen 2007). A parallel development took place in Norway 
and Sweden (Allvin & Aronsson 2003).
The Command and Control governance model was in this way supplemented by a 
decentralized participation model to ensure that companies themselves could solve WE 
issues in cooperation between employers and employees with the control and guidance 
from the Labour Inspection and the social partners (Rieper 1985). In the preamble of 
the Working Environment Act it is stipulated that the norm is to create “a safe and 
healthy working environment that is always in accordance with the technical and soci-
etal development” (Beskæftigelsesministeriet 2005). According to the preparatory work 
of the law this preamble should be interpreted as companies must always “strive for a 
WE that is on par with the best companies when it comes to safety and health” (Falk 
et al. 1978:42; Kristiansen 2005:361), and actually go further, if the societal perception 
precedes the best companies (Huulgaard & Knudsen 1991:42). Similar norms are in-
cluded in the WE Acts in Sweden and Norway, even though, that these Acts more clearly 
emphasise the aim of creating a safe and healthy WE compared to the Danish WE Act 
(Lindøe et al. 2001; Trygstad & Lismoen 2008). 
The governing principle of the WE during this period was primarily based on devel-
opment of democracy and employee involvement, and the technical and social develop-
ments in society provided the normative standard. Thus, the governance of the WE was 
primarily informed by the logic of democracy in the period between 1975 and 2001, and 
in order to support this development knowledge and education of safety representatives 
were established. The logic of the state was still important in the period, but this logic 
was less predominant as a governing principle, compared to the logic of democracy. 
This is also consistent with the development of more reflexive forms of regulation that 
delegated the WE problems to be solved directly between management and employees 
at the company level (Koch & Nielsen 1998).
This entails that the norm for the WE, is not only linked to the statutory standard 
of worker protection laws, as was the case of the 1954 legislation, but in accordance 
with the new, and more dynamic, Framework Principle, the working environment was 
to be on par with those companies doing it best, and the most predominant governance 
principle was informed by the logic of democracy. 
second shift: From logic of democracy to logic of the market (1975-2007)
New regulative proposals coming from the Labour Inspectorate on reduction of noise 
levels and improvement of working conditions for sewerage workers, were perceived as 
a threat to the improvement of competitiveness and to combat the high unemployment 
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rates (Litske 1987). During the economic crisis in the early 1980s the Social Democratic 
Government introduced cost-benefit analyses of all new proposals for WE regulations. 
In the middle of the eighties, when a Conservative Government took office, the issue of 
WE was increasingly connected with commercial policy objectives. Under the heading 
‘Working Environment and Growth’, requirements for the WE were, according to the 
conservative-led government, to lead to product innovation, expertise and export op-
portunities (Arbejdsministeriet 1986).
With the ‘Clean Working Environment 2005’-reform of 1995, new instruments 
were identified, where the aim was to stimulate the politically observant consumer, so 
more WE friendly services and goods were chosen. Under the headline “The working 
environment - the individual’s responsibility throughout the lifetime”, the individual 
citizen was called upon to contribute to a clean WE. The consumer role was to be 
changed so that WE friendly goods and services were demanded (Arbejdstilsynet 1995). 
Although these steps were not implemented in practice during the program period 
(Arbejdstilsynet 2007), they were nevertheless a harbinger of a shift to a new organising 
principle in dealing with the WE. 
Initiatives related to the inclusive labour market and CSR in the late 1990s focused 
on getting companies to bear a greater share of social responsibility for public services, 
especially in order to retain employees with reduced work capacity (Boxenbaum 2005; 
Holt 2000; Nielsen & Dyreborg 2001). In this way the WE policies were coupled with 
other policy fields, which moderated its more conflict-oriented status. However, the WE 
was also brought out of the more isolated role it had in the joint health and safety com-
mittee, and was coupled with other strategic areas, which traditionally fell within the 
management’s rights to manage. As we will see, this development will put a pressure on 
the local joint health and safety committees, as an organizational framework for devel-
oping the WE at the company level.
Although this second shift became more evident with the presentation of the Lib-
eral-Conservative government’s WE reform 10. June 2003, it was a development that 
already had been started in the 1990s. In this new reform the politically observant con-
sumer received a new instrument, the Smiley-Scheme (Arbejdstilsynet 2005). The idea 
behind the ‘Clean Working environment Reform’ in 1995 was to make the WE a public 
issue, with a focus on consumer choice of WE-friendly products and services. This re-
form can be seen as a precursor to the Smiley Scheme. However, the smileys were, in the 
end, not labelled on the WE friendly products, but on the individual company exposing 
its working conditions to the institutional environment:
“Claus Hjort Frederiksen [Minister of Employment] emphasizes that the smiley scheme 
will strengthen prevention in the companies, because each company’s efforts in improving 
the working environment becomes visible to both employees, customers and the public ...” 
(Arbejdstilsynet 2004).
The WE thus becomes more and more articulated in a competitive perspective, using 
market forces as a means to improve the WE, which in turn paves the way for more 
market-oriented governance structures. The logic of the market, as a basic principle for 
the governance of the WE, has come to the forefront, and regulative measures are being 
implemented that will expose the company’s social responsibility for the WE towards a 
broader range of stakeholders. The normative standard is the expectation from the insti-
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tutional environment for the content and extent of this responsibility. The WE Authority 
is given a new and growing role in making the content and scope of each company’s 
social responsibility visible to its external stakeholders, e.g., by making the individual 
company’s smiley public on the authority’s web site. A negative smiley exposes the com-
pany to the environment, which in turn could transform it into a reputational risk for 
the company, a term suggested by Michael Power et al. (2009). 
From implicit to explicit social responsibility for work safety
In the investigated period from 1954 to 2007 it is not questioned whether companies 
should take social responsibility for the management of the WE. However, as an answer 
to the first research question, the analysis has shown that there are significant changes 
in the institutional logics that govern this social responsibility for the WE. In the first 
period the WE was governed through the enforcement of rules and regulations, which 
were drawing on the logic of the state, and the normative standards, are stipulated in the 
law. In the second period, beginning in 1975, the democracy and employee involvement 
came to be the prime mode of governance of the WE together with the introduction of 
a decentralised structure at company level for the election of safety representatives and 
procedures and roles for cooperation between employers and employees with regard to 
solving WE issues (Nielsen 1986:4-9). This governance structure draws on the logic of 
democracy, and the technical and social development in society provided the normative 
standard that companies should strive for. 
Finally, in the third period beginning in 2001, new regulative changes and policies 
emerged, e.g., the introduction of various performance standards and corporate social 
responsibility approaches that emphasised competition and exposure to the institutional 
environment of the companies’ performances, and as such the governance of WE was 
increasingly drawing on the logic of the market. The expectations from the institutional 
environment provided the new normative standards that companies were to interpret 
and strive for (Figure 1). 
The latter historical period is relatively short and consequently the empirical basis 
is weaker, and therefore should be interpreted with some caution. In addition, there 
was not a larger law complex adopted by the Danish Parliament, but rather incre-
mental changes of the 1975 law. However, 2001 was a turning point, partly because 
of new legislation putting emphasis on the market perspective and partly because a 
new Liberal-Conservative government took office, who emphasised the deregulation 
and the market logic as a prime governance principle. However, it should be empha-
sised that the other two logics, the logic of the state and the logic of democracy did 
not disappear in the period, but they were less salient and to a lesser degree a part 
of the public discourse on the development of the WE. Thus the WE Act is still being 
enforced by the WE Authority and safety representatives are still being participating. 
However, more soft law elements were introduced in the period, and the new poli-
cies, like certification and the smiley-scheme, enabled the logic of the market. Ove K. 
Pedersen (2011) underpins this dominance of the logic of the market in a newly pub-
lished book in which he argues that the Danish welfare state is being transformed to a 
‘competition state’, which has other tasks than the welfare state and is also organized 
and governed differently.
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Thus all three logics, and perhaps even other less dominant or widespread logics in the 
institutional field, are available for people and organisations in the field of the WE to 
challenge and to use, and must be seen as potentially competing logics. However, the 
analysis indicates that the logic of the market is the dominant in the latter period, and 
will provide the most important logic that individuals will draw upon in their produc-
tion and reproduction of their material subsistence, in providing meaning to the devel-
opment of the WE and to the practices and rule structures used in the field. A report 
from the Nordic Council of Ministers also concludes that the governance of the WE in 
all Nordic countries put increased emphasis on the market logic, but in varying degrees 
Figure 1: changes in the dominant institutional logics for the governance of the 
working environment at the societal level, Denmark (1954-2007)
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in the Nordic countries, with less emphasis on the logic of the market in Finland and 
most emphasis on the logic of the market in Denmark (Lindøe et al. 2001:105-106).
Whereas the social responsibility for the WE primarily has been an implicit part of 
the formal and informal legal and collaborative system at the workplace, the responsibil-
ity has increasingly become more explicit as ‘corporate social responsibility’, drawing on 
the logic of the market in the last decade (Matten & Moon 2008; Trygstad & Lismoen 
2008). It is no longer sufficient that companies comply with the rules and regulations, 
or that they involve their employees, but rather it has become a key virtue to show the 
right attitudes to meet stakeholders’ expectations for taking social responsibility for the 
WE and to counter reputational risks. 
The position of the employees has also changed over time, from a passive object 
of protection (victim) to one who has legal rights to watch over via the democratic 
structures (participant), and finally the employees are increasingly seen in a resource 
perspective (resource). The latter perspective entails an increasing focus on reducing 
absenteeism, improve job retention, reduce early retirement and thereby increase the 
availability of manpower. This does not mean that worker participation, i.e., the logic 
of democracy, is no more important for improving the WE, but that worker involve-
ment has become a less predominant logic, and it may be that employee participation 
has become a means to an end, rather than the end in itself. 
The emerging logic of the market establishes a competitive framework where repu-
tational risk (Power et al. 2009) constitutes an important element in the governance of 
WE. This framework provides new governance mechanisms that is enabled by the state 
and influenced by a range of external stakeholders as a potential risk to the company, 
and in turn provides the basis for new market-oriented measures in the governance of 
the WE, i.e., the logic of the market. CSR must be seen as an explicit strategy adopted by 
companies to counter governance mechanisms based on the logic of the market.
The second purpose of the article was to examine the importance of these institu-
tional changes for governance of the WE at the level of the construction industry and 
individual corporations, and whether the explicit framework, i.e., the market logic, is 
adjuncts to the existing governance principles or an alternative? Expressed in an institu-
tional perspective the conflicting logics of the governance of the WE will be examined. 
This question will be examined through four case studies representing some of the larg-
est Danish construction projects in recent times, where the explicit framework and CSR 
strategies have played an increasing role.
the construction industry – and its new institutional environment
Industrial associations have been aware of the growing importance of the demands to 
companies coming from stakeholders in their environment. In a report by the Danish 
Construction Association this is made clear:
“The requirements for companies on social responsibility, especially in the working envi-
ronment field, will henceforth be ever greater. A safety certificate is a tangible proof that 
the company is making a determined effort to ensure employee health and welfare. The 
certified company will be much stronger in the competition for new customers and new 
workforce” (Dansk Byggeri 2004).
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A certificate is in this case highlighted as a tangible proof of being socially responsible, 
and thus having a competitive edge in attracting both customers and workforce. The 
visible evidence demonstrating the right attitude is not an insignificant factor in the 
legitimacy of CSR regarding the WE. This development also manifests itself in changing 
WE strategies in relation to recent years’ major construction projects in Denmark. In the 
following I will examine how the governance of the WE is transformed into an explicit 
framework in these major construction projects, and what it means for how the WE is 
being managed. The case analysis will start with the construction of the Great Belt Link, 
Denmark.
the Great belt link construction runs into stakeholder problems 
The establishment of the Great Belt Link, a 16 km tunnel and bridge link between the 
two main Danish islands started in 1988 and lasted 10 years. The large and sustained 
attention as this construction project had from the stakeholders in the environment was 
something entirely new for the construction industry at that time. There were two main 
reasons for this attention from the external stakeholders. First of all it was triggered 
by the project’s controversial status already from the beginning because of the possible 
ecological impact, and secondly public attention was drawn to the problems that the 
project encountered along the way of political, technical and safety related aspects. For 
example, severe safety problems were encountered in relation to the excavation of the 
tunnel under the Great Belt, as the following example illustrates:
Suddenly, 11 June 1994 in the early morning, a gas alarm started in the northern 
tunnel under the Great Belt on the Zealand side and 10 seconds after a violent explosion 
occurred in front of the large tunnel boring machine Dania. Stig Christensen (conductor 
and tunnel foreman):
“My inner voice said to me ‘Stig, now you drive into a two-kilometer long tunnel, 50 me-
ters below sea level, where a 220 meter long tunnel boring machine is in flames (...) and I 
just got a regular panic attack” (Christensen 2007).
Work on the Great Belt was dangerous, and although the fire did not cost lives, it was 
such events that attracted the attention of workers, unions and other stakeholders to the 
poor WE on the project. There were seven fatal accidents during the construction of the 
Great Belt Link, and the accident incidence rate was about twice the rate of the construc-
tion industry in general (Dyreborg 2006; Dyreborg et al. 2010). The contractor of the 
Great Belt Link had not established a safety and information team with adequate exper-
tise to handle such a complex and difficult project with regard to safety (Nielsen 2007). 
According to the regulations, it was the contractors’ responsibility to manage safety at 
the site, apart from safety in public areas, where the client was required to coordinate 
safety. However, since the client was mainly concerned with the legal aspects and col-
laborative relationships internally within the project, the client was unable to match the 
emerging expectations from stakeholders in the environment and to demonstrate social 
responsibility for the large project (Dyreborg 2006). 
The Great Belt Consortium’s communication policy was oriented towards the tradi-
tional three parties, namely government, employees’ and employer’s organizations. This 
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communication strategy was, however, out of step with the new network of stakeholders 
and their expectations. For example, the client could not demonstrate social responsi-
bility to the stakeholders by passing the responsibility for the poor safety standards to 
the individual contractor. Seen from the stakeholders’ perspective, it was the client who 
appeared as the one who was responsible for the safety conditions at the construction 
project. These factors contributed to the fact that this large construction project ran into 
major problems in relation to stakeholders, and it resulted in long delays. In addition, 
the project received a ‘posthumous reputation’ as being scandalous, particularly because 
the accident rate was well above the industry average (Nielsen 2007; Overgaard 1991). 
The experience from the construction of the Great Belt Link thus demonstrated that it 
became more important to establish a wider social acceptance, when large public con-
struction projects were to be undertaken (Dyreborg 2006).
the oresund Link - a turning point for safety in construction
The client of the Oresund Link between Denmark and Sweden on the Danish part of the 
project, the Danish government, did not want the serious problems from the Great Belt 
Link repeated during the construction of the Øresund link. One of many new initiatives 
on this project was that the client undertook the coordination requirement concern-
ing the WE and thereby stood as a notable pioneer client in the industry. The WE was 
thus a major focus area in the establishment of social responsibility, and the project 
instituted new standards for the organization of WE in larger construction projects. For 
instance, safety campaigns, safety courses, safety rounds, and monitoring systems were 
introduced, and the approach was also supported by representatives of management 
and labour, who also put a lot of efforts into the safety work during the construction of 
the link (Øresund A/S et al. 1997). Overall, this strategy contributed to an improvement 
of the work safety, and led to a significant reduction in the number of accidents during 
the construction of the Oresund Link (Spangenberg et al. 2002). Interestingly though, 
the Danish construction workers experienced 4-5 times more accidents on this project 
compared to their Swedish colleagues (Spangenberg et al. 2003). 
However, the need to establish new forms of relationships with the stakeholders 
was recognised by the client if social acceptance of this major construction project was 
to be achieved. This awareness is expressed quite well in the interim report of the Ore-
sund Link, concerning the WE (Øresund A/S et al. 1997).
“A large infrastructure project such as the Oresund Link is, when it is finished, more than 
the sum of the steel and concrete, it consists of. The very making must match the sur-
rounding community’s demands and the external perception of an environmentally sound, 
ethical and responsible behaviour, which includes the conditions that the thousands of 
employees are working under.”
The actual interim report was part of a communications strategy aiming to build public 
acceptance and understanding of this large construction project. Underway in the project 
doorbells were rung at each of the affected neighbours, and public meetings were held 
for residents and other stakeholders who were affected by the project (Poulsen 1998). 
This was the turning point that illustrates that the inward-looking, the technical scientific 
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rationale, and the legal focus were no longer enough to achieve legitimacy among the 
stakeholders. This is expressed clearly by the Information Officer for A / S Øresund, Ajs 
Dam, (quoted here from (Poulsen 1998:57).
“We executed a 360 degree environmental analysis from the clients, i.e. from the  
[Danish] Ministry to the green organizations, neighbours, users, governments, municipali-
ties, contractors, unions and so on. If we were to have room for our company, we had  
to create confidence and trust that we could manage the task and that we would treat 
others properly.”
The client of the Great Belt Construction failed by only using a one-way communica-
tion strategy, where information was sent out without knowing about stakeholder 
expectations. With the Oresund Link construction this was recognised, and by use 
of environmental analysis the stakeholders’ expectations and thus the reputational 
risks were known, and it was possible to integrate them into the corporate strategy. 
The communication policy for the Øresund Link project aimed at calming down any 
public feelings that possibly could disturb the core activities of the project (Poulsen 
1998: 61).
“The objective of the Øresund Link communication strategy is to gain public acceptance 
of the project and provide such a relationship to the public that the technical organization 
will have peace and quiet to accomplish the project.”
The need to shield the core activities from the outside world is particularly sensitive in 
the case above, where a huge and controversial building project has been launched. This 
clear demarcation of a new communication strategy, I would describe as a watershed in 
the governance of risk reputation, at least when talking about major public construction 
projects in Denmark. This model for organizing the WE and managing risk reputation 
is indeed maintained by subsequent large construction projects, such as the establish-
ment of the Copenhagen Metro and the Multimedia house of the Danish Broadcasting 
Corporation (DR).
During the construction of the Multimedia house of the Danish Broadcasting 
Corporation (DR) an intensive communication with the stakeholders was likewise es-
tablished. This strategy was to contribute to maintaining or enhancing the brand of 
DR. The experience from the Oresund Link project provided a strategy for managing 
the institutional environment, which could be taken over by other large construction 
projects. 
However, managing risk reputation is not without cost to an organization. Both the 
Metro project and the DR Multimedia house project pursued another major innovation 
of the Øresund project, the establishment of an external reference group for health and 
safety. It functioned as an ‘external safety committee’ which laid the strategic framework 
for the WE at the construction project. The reference group had representatives from 
public authorities, trade unions, entrepreneurs and people from the industry in general. 
These representatives could act as an intermediary between stakeholders in the environ-
ment and their expectations for a socially responsible building project, and on the other 
hand, act as ‘ambassadors’ for the client and the builders, by continually sending out 
positive messages to their hinterland and stakeholders. The cost is the time and influence 
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that the client had to provide to this external reference group. The possible outcome is a 
reduced reputational risk and increased legitimacy of the organisation.
Kjeld Boye-Møller (Project Director, DR):
“It also works the other way round, so that the reference group will be the ambassadors 
of the stuff, i.e., the attitudes we have, (...) They know about the factual things we do, and 
carry it over into their system , it’s a good thing.”
Interviewer:
“What can you make of it, that they carry it over, if one could say so?”
Kjeld Boye-Møller (who in this case refers to the construction of the Oresund Link):
“I remember an episode from Sydhavnsgade [Building site] where there was a crane top-
pling down into the excavation, one evening, and I think it was TV2 [national television] 
that was out there first. Before I came to answer the media, the Working Environment 
Authority responded to the media saying that the Oresund Link construction project 
does everything they can for the working environment, so there is nothing to worry 
about.”
In this case the client achieved a normative legitimacy in the environment, which means 
that their behaviour and actions are assessed on the basis of values that are desirable in 
the field (Suchman 1995). The Labour Inspection Authority’s evaluation was not based 
on a condemnation of the current event in itself, but rather assessed it in relation to the 
actor, as a normative judgement. The client, in this case for the Oresund Link project, 
had succeeded in the creation of a solid legitimacy in the institutional field to such an 
extent, that a reasonable serious incident, instead of criticism of the client and the man-
agement of the project, lead to a reaffirmation of their efforts in establishing a reputa-
tion of having a high WE standard.
Managing legitimacy had become as important as managing the project in itself, in 
order to preserve the image of a socially responsible corporation, in this case regarding 
safety management. Reputational risks have become costly for companies, and in expen-
ditures may exceed the cost of safety measures.
Henning (Director, NCC)
“... if they [employees] do something in order to gain advantage without using the proper 
safety equipment, we actually look at it very critically. We do not look at it as if they’ve 
saved resources; we look at it as if they have damaged our image.”
The general public is present in both the client’s and the contractor’s assessment of 
their relations with the environment, as a reflexive component. The great importance 
attached to the institutional environment and the reputational risks it could encounter, 
has not only been materialized internally in terms of marketing, company policies, safety 
measures and emergency plans, but also in the establishment of the client’s communica-
tion contingency plan, in case of sudden reputational crises. The concern about how the 
organization is perceived by the institutional environment has been internalised (Power 
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et al. 2009). The logic of the market is thus present in the organisational policies, proce-
dures and practices with regard to the WE.
However, it is equally important that the logic of the market, within the institutional 
field, opens up entirely new forms of governance of the WE in the construction industry. 
In 2005 a ‘grade book’ was introduced, that all construction companies were to possess 
in order to bid on public tenders. Each contractor’s ‘grade book’ includes information 
on exceeding of time and economy, the extent of defects, customer satisfaction and work 
accidents (Hesdorf et al. 2003). This is how CEO Curt Liliegreen, The Building Evalua-
tion Centre, describes the idea of the grade book (Liliegreen 2004).
“The companies that in one way or another engage in sloppy or cheating activities, will 
obviously not get very good grades, and it would therefore be difficult for them to get 
contracts for governmental building projects.”
Like the smiley scheme, the grade book aims to expose the builder’s WE performance 
and other types of performances to consumers and other stakeholders in the environ-
ment, which in turn will have indirect implications for their earning power. Without an 
institutional environment based on the market logic, the smiley scheme and the grade 
book would probably have limited impact.
we between an implicit and explicit framework 
Seen in an institutional perspective CSR is not just a new attractive concept that com-
panies voluntarily can use in order to impress the institutional environment (Campbell 
2006). On the contrary, it is rather a ‘must’ that companies must manage the dynamic 
pressure on the company, which in this case means that the larger contractors and build-
ers are forced to handle the increasingly demanding institutional environment and repu-
tational risks regarding the WE. In this respect, firms have not necessarily become more 
socially responsible with regards to the WE as such, but it has been necessary to make 
the social responsibility more explicit towards a broader and perhaps a more complex 
range of stakeholders, that previously only counted the state and the social partners. An 
important question is to what extent the more explicit market oriented framework, such 
as CSR, influences the implicit social responsibility integrated in the existent framework 
for the governance of the WE in the Nordic countries (Morsing & Beckmann 2006; 
Shanahan & Khagram 2006).
From internal to external ‘watchdogs’ of the we 
The Joint Health and Safety Committee has been characterized as the company’s inter-
nal watchdog for the WE (Jensen 1990), which should ensure that companies meet the 
normative standards. The Working Environment Acts in the Nordic countries stipulate 
the basic rules and procedures for how the employer and employees in cooperation shall 
solve WE issues with guidance from the authorities (Hasle 2001; Jensen 1990; Rieper 
1985). The previous analysis has shown that the traditional tripartite cooperation has 
been challenged by a broader set of stakeholders in the institutional environment. The 
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problem of the safety organization is not just that the prevention activities seem to be 
reactive and ad hoc (Hasle 2001; Jensen 1990), but more fundamentally, that the safety 
organization is unable to capture the wider set of stakeholder interest that exist when 
major public construction projects are carried out. In other words, the management’s 
strategic focus on the WE has shifted from workers as the primary stakeholders, to 
a broader and more nonspecific group of external stakeholders, including the public, 
neighbours, NGOs, etc.
This is illustrated quite well with the establishment of the external reference group 
during the construction of the Oresund Link, the Copenhagen Metro and the DR Mul-
timedia house, as described above. Although this external reference group only included 
the traditional “internal” stakeholders, this shows clearly a need for a new structure that 
can capture the expectations from a broader range of stakeholders in the “grey zone” 
between safety and health legislation, cooperation and the political environment, or the 
‘sub-politics’ as suggested by Matten (2004) in accordance with Beck (1997).
This development implies that the driving force in developing the WE will be lo-
cated in the triangle between the state, management and the institutional environment. 
As is illustrated in Figure 2, this implies that the local joint health and safety commit-
tee tend to be switched off, as soon as the triangular relationship between government, 
business and environment becomes the main focal point for carrying out WE activities. 
A similar observation is made by Lindøe et al (2001:108 and figure 7.1), who suggest 
that the strength of the tripartite system at the national level remains strong, but that 
it will be weakened at the local level because the governance of the WE will bypass the 
tripartite system. 
Figure 2: The shift from and implicit to an explicit framework for governance of the working 
environment
Traditionally, the enforcement of WE regulations by the authorities has been the most 
dominant approach to ensure social responsibility for the safety of workers, and the 
Joint Health and Safety Committee was intended to have the role as the ‘internal watch-
dog’, keeping an eye on whether WE standards were met, and if not, to report it to the 
labour inspectorate. The increasing importance of the institutional environment involves 
a somewhat broader range of stakeholders or ‘external watchdogs’ that mediate the 
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provision of social expectations through a range of channels. The established mecha-
nisms, smiley schemes, certification schemes, etc., will, in principle, give the institutional 
environment the means to keep up with companies’ WE behaviour, and in turn provide 
new sources of reputational risk for companies (Power et al. 2009). I will take these 
arrangements as a manifestation of an institutionalization of a market-oriented gover-
nance of the WE, i.e., the logic of the market, which is reflected in both legal, normative 
and material practices.
The construction industry’s increased orientation towards the institutional environ-
ment thus creates an entirely new arena for the governance of the WE. As such, the joint 
health and safety committee, as an arena for influence and development, can thus be 
pushed somewhat into the background. In her inquiry into the handling of chemicals in 
Australia over two decades, Suzanne Benn (2004:408) identified similar patterns. In this 
case, local committees were established that helped to facilitate communication between 
companies, communities and authorities at the points where the traditional tripartite 
cooperation did not cover. Similarly, it appears that the Joint Health and Safety Commit-
tees at the large construction projects analysed in this paper, were not able to capture the 
broader range of stakeholders throughout the institutional environment, and therefore 
may be captured via the established external reference group for safety. Interestingly, this 
external safety committee opens up new channels for involvement of stakeholders, and 
thus a broader democratic perspective that challenges the employees and the state as the 
primary stakeholders.
conclusion:  the Nordic working environment Model  
between implicit and explicit frameworks
Seen from the institutional perspective used in this paper, some significant changes were 
identified in the institutional logics informing the governance of the WE. During the 
period examined, there has been a shift from an implicit social responsibility embedded 
in the institutions related to the Nordic WE model, to a more explicit corporate social 
responsibility for the governance of the WE. The social responsibility for the WE in the 
implicit approach was secured through the enforcement of the WE Act (the logic of the 
state) and involvement of employees in developing the WE (the logic of democracy). The 
explicit social responsibility is very much tied to a more market-oriented governance of 
the WE (the logic of the market), where companies come to be accountable to a wider 
range of external stakeholders.
This entails that the corporate strategic focus on the WE tend to move from 
the safety organization to the institutional environment in order to better address 
the expectations of the external stakeholders affected by the large construction 
projects examined in this paper. This was solved on the Øresund Link construction 
project through the creation of the ‘external reference group’ for health and safety 
at work, with participation from the government, trade unions, entrepreneurs and 
people from the industry in general, which together contributed to the improvement 
of safety on this construction project. The management’s strategic focus on the ex-
ternal stakeholders, regarding the WE at the DR Multimedia construction project 
meant that the safety representatives experienced that it was management who ‘drove 
the WE business’. This contributed to the strategic development of the WE mainly 
154 Safety matters have become too important for management Johnny Dyreborg
being located in the relationship between state, management and the external envi-
ronment. 
A strong focus on accident rates implied that the on-site safety performance was 
primarily focusing on the employees’ safety behaviour, absenteeism and return to work 
programs and to a lesser degree on the primary prevention on-site. The WE became part 
of a ‘human resource management’ strategy. The results demonstrate that, at the very 
moment when new forms of governance of the WE come into force, such as certification, 
smiley schemes and other types of performance measures, then the content and form of 
the social responsibility for the WE will change.
To the extent that the WE is seen in a worker protection perspective, and linked to 
standards in the WE Act, then the joint health and safety committee makes up an ap-
propriate organizational arena for solving problems related to the WE. But, at the point 
where the WE becomes part of a corporate strategic perspective, such as CSR linked to 
norms in the institutional environment, then the joint health and safety committee is 
‘cracking at the seams’. The reason for this is that the WE is coupled with policy areas 
falling under the human resource management domain, for example if work accidents 
are seen in the perspective of absenteeism, and not accident prevention. Problems which 
in the legal sense are defined as a matter between the employee and the WE, e.g., ex-
posure to accidental risks, and which can be a case for the joint health and safety com-
mittee and the labour inspection authority, can shift into the corporate agreement arena 
that governs the relationships between management and employees. 
These changes can cause conflicts between the more implicit social responsibility for 
the WE, and the more explicit corporate social responsibility, i.e., conflicts between the 
three institutional logics (Figure 3). There is partly a conflict between the enforcement 
of a law, i.e., the logic of the state, based on a prevention idea where the (long term) 
primary prevention is fundamental, and then the need for companies to demonstrate 
Figure 3:  Potential conflicts between three institutional logics the governance of the working  
environment
 Nordic journal of working life studies Volume 1  ❚  Number 1  ❚  August 2011 155
corporate social responsibility here and now to their institutional environment, i.e., the 
logic of the market. Due to pressure from the institutional environment, in this case 
competition on accident rates, focus is directly on the frequency of accidents. It shows an 
unfortunate side effect of this type of regulation that could mean a shift in the company’s 
focus on accident prevention. Instead of the ‘long haul’ to reduce the risk of accidents at 
work, then, the solutions focus rather on compensation. This could be the introduction 
of swift and efficient back-to-work measures for injured employees, in order to avoid 
an accident being counted in the accident statistics, a phenomenon known as ‘trickery’ 
(Jæger 2005). One of the basic prevention principles laid down in the EU Framework 
Directive (1989), that prevention should take place as close as possible to the source of 
the hazards, seems to be weakened in the practical WE activities.
A conflict was also identified between the implicit social responsibility, i.e., the logic 
of democracy, and the explicit corporate social responsibility with regard to the role of 
the safety representative. When the corporate social responsibility takes over, and it is the 
triangular relationship between government, company and external stakeholders, that 
is pivotal for the development of the WE, the safety representatives will have to share 
their role and influence with other external stakeholders. Instead of being participants 
in shaping the WE, there is a danger that employees are only involved to the extent that 
management takes the necessary detour and consults the employees in order to fulfil their 
corporate social responsibility. In this sense the Nordic WE model as the basic framework 
for the governance of the WE in the Nordic countries could be challenged, in particular 
when it comes to the local involvement of employees. Where the WE is driven by the co-
operation between employers and employees in the Nordic WE model, then the develop-
ment and definition of what counts as WE, seems to be driven mainly by the management 
in the explicit CSR perspective. This tendency is facilitated by the voluntary aspect that 
the EU assumes regarding CSR, and this provides management a central role in the defini-
tion of CSR (Frostenson & Borglund 2006). An important question that cannot be fully 
answered from this study, is to what extend employees are involved in the development 
of the CSR strategies in the Nordic countries (Trygstad & Lismoen 2008). 
However, at this point there is also a potential for sustaining the democratic and 
participative principles, since it opens up to the external stakeholders, including the 
unions, being able to influence the individual company’s transactions regarding the WE, 
as was the case with the external reference group for the Øresund Link construction 
project. In the three construction projects, the Oresund Link, the Copenhagen Metro 
and the DR Multimedia house, the safety representatives had to share their influence 
with the external reference group. In the explicit CSR framework, it is thus important 
to distinguish between the role of the trade union at a regional or national level and the 
role of workers and their representatives at the company level. The trade union level 
would be even more important in order to ensure WE cooperation on the company 
level, and not only to cooperate on the more general level with regard to participation 
in development of WE regulations (Preuss et al. 2006).
In light of the foregoing it is concluded that the explicit framework and CSR ap-
proaches, must be seen as a competing perspective, informed by the logic of the market, 
and not merely a supplement to the existing implicit framework for the governance of 
the WE in the Nordic model, informed by the logic of democracy and the logic of the 
state. Whether these changes in the institutional logics will result in a better WE or not, 
will depend on the extent to which external stakeholders, in practise, have interests and 
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opportunities to act as watchdogs (Braun & Gearhart 2004). In the case where external 
stakeholders are not persistent, it may be a step backwards for the WE, particularly 
if employees’ position as internal watchdogs in the meantime becomes weakened. In 
addition, it must be questioned whether performance goals, smileys and other rating 
instruments, which form part of the market-oriented governance of WE, are reliable 
and sensitive enough to inform external stakeholders. In this sense, the WE could be too 
important an issue to leave up to external stakeholders. 
There are some limitations in this study. Firstly, it is only the construction industry 
that has been examined and it is only larger construction companies having been in-
cluded. Smaller companies might not be representative of these findings. Secondly, the 
comparison with other Nordic countries is not straightforward, as only secondary data 
have been used. For these reasons, caution should be taken in extending these findings 
to other industries and settings, i.e., how important the logic of the market will be in 
relation to the governance of the WE in the other Nordic countries. As indicated above, 
Denmark might be the Nordic country where the market logic most strongly has influ-
enced the governance of the WE, and for this reason it represents an informative case for 
the study of challenges to the Nordic WE model, as shown in this paper.
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end note
1 All quotations are translated by the author, from Danish to English. 
